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Do the effects of corruption upon growth differ across political regimes?   
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Many studies find that corruption lowers economic growth. However, most of these 
studies do not consider whether the effects of corruption upon growth differ across 
countries. This paper investigates whether the association between corruption and 
economic growth differs between democracies and authoritarian regimes.  Consider 
illegal corruption and legal lobbying, both forms of rent seeking, as imperfect substitutes.  
Suppose lobbying is easier to do in democracies.  Then, lowering corruption in 
authoritarian regimes could have greater growth benefits because of the lower 
substitutability between corruption and lobbying in these countries. Using cross-country, 
annual data from 1984 to 2007, we regress economic growth on: the inverse of the level 
of corruption, the degree of democracy, and an interaction term combining the two.  We 
find that coefficients are positive on the first two variables.  However, the coefficient on 
the interactive term is negative, suggesting that the benefits upon growth of controlling 
corruption are actually greater in authoritarian regimes.  
 
 
JEL Classifications: O40, O43, O50 
Keywords: Economic Growth, Democracy, Corruption 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the vast differences in income levels and economic growth rates 
has attracted much attention with many explanations for these differences.  Many see 
these differences stemming from institutional causes as some institutions provide 
incentives for productive activities whereas others lead to rent seeking.
1
  One example of 
rent seeking is corruption where public officials abuse their power in order to extract 
payments from firms.  Such abuse commonly results in personal gain for those in 
command at the expense of the populace (World Bank, 1997).  Since such practices 
dissuade productive activities, they have the potential to lower growth (Svensson, 2005).  
Corruption has not always been viewed negatively.  Earlier studies considered 
corruption as pro-growth because it allowed firms to avoid distortions caused by 
government failures.  Corruption was seen as “speed up” money that facilitated 
productive activities (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968 and Aidt, 2003). However, in recent 
years, most views see corruption as lowering growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mo, 
1991; and Mauro, 1995).
2
  Much empirical work has also found negative associations 
between corruption and growth.  We also empirically consider the effects of corruption 
upon economic growth but we consider a different specification than do most others.  We 
allow the effects of corruption upon economic growth to differ across countries.  Perhaps 
corruption is more harmful for some countries than for others. 
                                                            
1 See North (1990), Hall and Jones (1999), and Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) for examples and 
surveys of this literature.   
2 The conventional wisdom among the public is that corruption is anti-growth (see Lambert-Mogiliansky, 
Majumdar and Radner, 2007).  According to the World Bank, corruption is the greatest obstacle to effective 
social and economic development (Akai, Horiuchi, & Sakata, 2005). 
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More specifically, we investigate whether the effects of corruption upon 
economic growth differ across political regimes, namely authoritarian ones versus 
democracies.  Suppose opportunities for rent seeking differ across political regimes.  For 
example, if (legal) lobbying and (illegal) corruption are imperfect substitutes, then a 
crackdown of corruption should lead to an increase in lobbying.  If lobbying of 
government officials is easier in democratic regimes, then the crackdown upon corruption 
will have less effect on the total level of rent seeking in democracies and so have fewer 
growth benefits.  Our empirical analysis will determine whether this story is viable or not.  
Past researchers have also considered links between political regime and corruption.  
However, such research has often considered whether democratization leads to more or 
less corruption (see section 2 for examples).  Instead, we consider whether the type of 
political regime influences the effects of corruption upon economic growth.  To the best 
of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that empirically examines this issue.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of 
the different studies on corruption, democracy and economic growth.  Section 3 provides 
more details as to how the type of political regime can influence the effects of corruption 
upon economic growth.  Data for our study is described in section 4.  Section 5 then 
presents the empirical model.  Section 6 shows results.  Section 7 concludes the paper by 
providing suggestions for future work.   
 
2. Literature Review 
Economists and political scientists have long debated how corruption affects 
economic growth.  Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) argue that corruption might 
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enhance growth for two reasons.  First, it might be used as “speed money” that allows 
agents to avoid delays due to bureaucratic red tape.  It “greases the wheels”.  Second, 
corrupt employees might work harder because bribes create incentives for greater work 
effort.  On the other hand, Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) view corruption as lowering 
growth.
1
  Mauro (1995) explains the lower growth through corruption’s negative effect 
on investment.  Mo (1991) sees corruption as lowering growth through less political 
stability.  In addition to growth, Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme (2002) state that 
higher levels of corruption increase income inequality and poverty.  To the extent that 
corruption harms growth, then this is most problematic in developing countries as 
corruption is most pervasive in developing regions (Svensson, 2005).  
Another research path has examined the association between democracy and 
growth although with little consensus.  Some studies such as Levine and Renelt (1992) 
and Alesina et al (1996) find no direct relationship between growth and democracy.  In 
contrast, Barro (1996) asserts a non-linear relationship between the two. At low levels of 
democracy the effects upon growth are positive while at higher levels of democracy the 
association among the two becomes negative.  Wacziarg and Tavares (2001) considered 
several channels through which democratization could affect growth:  human capital, 
physical capital, income inequality, openness, etc.  Although some channels had positive 
associations and some negative ones, the total effect upon growth was small.  More 
recent work, however, such as Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), Rodrik and Wacziarg 
                                                            
1 See also Knack & Keefer (1995), Ades & Di Tella (1999), Triesman (2000), Mauro (1998), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993).  
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(2005) and Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) employ panel techniques and do find that 
democratization raises economic growth.    
Our study considers whether corruption affects growth differently in democracies 
as opposed to dictatorships.  Although we believe we are the first to empirically examine 
this question, we are not the first to consider that the effects of corruption upon economic 
growth could differ across countries.  Mendez and Sepulveda (2006) examine whether 
the effects of corruption upon growth differ across government size although they do not 
find strong evidence that it does.  Swaleheen and Stansel (2007) explore whether the 
impact of economic freedom alters the relationship between corruption and growth. 
Utilizing a panel specification, they find that corruption raises economic growth in 
countries with high economic freedom, while corruption lowers growth in countries with 
low levels of economic freedom.  Similarly, Meon and Weiil (2010) suggest that 
corruption is less harmful to efficiency in countries where institutions are less effective.    
 
3. Economic Framework 
In every political system, some rent seeking is inevitable, involving large 
opportunity costs of employing resources in this manner.
1
  Svensson (2005) defines rent 
seeking as “the socially costly pursuit of rents, often created by governmental 
interventions in the economy”.  Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) [MSV] divide rent-
seeking into two forms, namely private and public. Our focus in this paper is on the latter 
                                                            
1 Rent seeking lowers social welfare because of misallocation of scarce resources in pursuing 
redistributive outcomes that are not socially optimal. For a detailed discussion on the effects of rent-seeking 
on economic outcomes see Krueger (1974), Olson (1982), Bhagwati (1982), Murphy et al. (1993) and 
Lambsdorff (2002). Also, North (1990) argues that rent–seeking lowers growth.  
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where corruption redistributes wealth from the private sector to government officials.  
MSV argue that innovation drives economic growth.  But for these innovations to occur, 
“government-supplied goods” – such as permits, licenses and perhaps import quotas – 
must be issued to innovators. The high demand of these “goods” makes innovators 
primary targets of illegal activities which in turn lowers economic growth. 
Nevertheless, bribing corrupt officials need not be the only way that rent seeking 
could occur in pursuit of private gains from public officials.  MSV also divide rent 
seeking into (illegal) corruption and (legal) lobbying
1
.  Past work on rent seeking often 
differentiates corruption from lobbying based on who is being influenced.  While 
corruption is often associated with money given to policy enforcers, lobbying is usually 
associated with political campaign activities or other practices that aim to influence 
decision makers as they enact policies (Campos and Giovannoni, 2008).  
  Harstad and Svensson (2006, 2010) see these two types of rent seeking as 
substitutable, at least to some degree.  They suggest that a firm could switch the rules 
through lobbying while through bribery it could bend the rules.  Firms that successfully 
lobby the government to change the rules then need not bribe officials to bend the rules.
2
  
On the other hand, firms that can easily bribe officials might not then lobby for a change 
in the rules, especially if the outcomes of such attempts are greatly uncertain.  Firms, 
though, could always spend resources to pursue both means and later abandon the type of 
rent seeking that is less useful.   
                                                            
1 Of course, what is a legal activity in one country need not be legal in others.    
2 Of course, this substitutability is not perfect since a corrupt official could require a bribe if he would, 
instead, fraudulently claim that the firm is not following the rules.   
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Since we consider lobbying as targeted towards decision makers 
(representatives/MPs) whereas corruption is targeted toward bureaucrats that enforce the 
rules, the aforementioned substitutability between corruption and lobbying might not be 
identical across countries.  If opportunities for lobbying are less available in authoritarian 
regimes with fewer decision makers, then the degree of substitutability between the two 
is lower in these countries.  Perhaps lowering corruption in authoritarian regimes could 
have greater benefits for economic growth because of the lower substitutability between 
corruption and lobbying in these countries.  We test this hypothesis in the empirical work 
below.   
 
4. Description of the Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use annual data from 119 countries from 1984 to 2007.  To measure output 
per capita levels (GDP) and growth rates (GROWTH), we use data from the Penn World 
Tables, version 6.3.  Details of these and other variables are described in the appendix.  
The appendix also lists our sample countries and categorizes their political regimes 
following the classification by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008).  The democracy and 
corruption variables are described below.      
Democracy (DEM) is measured using the Freedom House (also known as the 
Gastil) index.  The index begins in 1972 and considers two measures of political freedom.  
The political rights component measures the extent of free and fair elections, political 
pluralism and the rights of political minorities. The civil liberties index measures 
individual liberties such as the freedoms of speech, to practice one’s religion, and to 
peaceably assemble.  Both sub-indices range from one to seven where lower numbers 
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indicate higher levels of freedom.  We rescale and invert this variable to the range 0-6 so 
that higher levels denote more political freedoms.
1
    
As an alternative measure of democracy we use the binary variable from 
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008).  They consider the Freedom House measures but 
they also consider other factors in assigning countries as democracies or not.  They create 
a dummy variable, DEM_PS, that takes the value one for a democracy and zero 
otherwise.  Like them, we consider a country as democratic regardless of whether they 
classify it as “partially democratic” or “fully democratic”.  In their classification system, 
a country is only considered to have democratized if that democratization was sustained 
and so did not revert back to authoritarianism.  Therefore, once DEM_PS becomes “one” 
it retains this value throughout the remainder of the sample period.
2,3 
The corruption index comes from Political Risk Services, a private firm that 
annually publishes the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This index is based on 
the opinion of experts and captures the degree to which “high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments” and to which “illegal payments are generally 
expected throughout lower levels of government in the form of bribes connected with 
import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or 
                                                            
1 Even though the Freedom House index is the most commonly used measure in empirical studies, it still 
has components that are not exactly measures of democracy. For instance, the power of the citizenry to 
exercise the right to own property, to make free economic resource-allocation decisions and to enjoy the 
fruits of such decisions are all included (Gastil, 1989). Another potential problem discussed in Barro (1996) 
stems from the fact that the Freedom House index is an ordinal variable and not a cardinal one.   
 
2 Unlike the indices of democracy mentioned above, Gerring et al. (2005) consider democracy as a stock 
variable and so their variable takes on larger values the longer a country remains democratic.   
3 Their dataset ends in 2003.  Therefore, to extend DEM_PS to 2007, we follow their methodology.  In 
addition, we removed Thailand from their set of countries that democratized given the events of 2007.   
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loans.”  ICRG classifies countries on a scale from 0 to 6, with 6 indicating low levels of 
corruption.
1
  
Democratization often accompanies economic reforms and not controlling for 
these could bias upward the estimated effects of democracy upon economic growth.  
Therefore, as a robustness check, we control for economic reforms utilizing the dataset 
constructed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and updated by Wacziarg and Welch (2003). 
That is a dummy variable [REFORM] that gets the value of one indicating trade openness 
and zero otherwise 0.
2
  Also, we control for economic freedom (ECON_ FREE)
3
 as in 
Swaleheen and Stansel (2007). Presumably, there is a positive correlation between 
democracy and economic freedom. 
 Table 1 Panel A presents descriptive statistics. Table 1 Panel B provides the 
covariances and correlations between the key variables in our study.  The growth rate of 
real GDP per capita shows significant variation between 88.74 to -64.36 as outliers are 
clearly present.  To better estimate coefficients applicable to the majority of countries, we 
remove observations whose absolute growth rate is greater than 10%.  Nevertheless, the 
                                                            
1
An alternative measure of corruption comes from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators 
constructed by Kaufmann et al. (1999).  Unfortunately, the first year of data begins in 1996 and annual data 
does not begin until 2000.   Despite the diminished sample size, our results are robust to using this WGI 
measure.   
 
2 REFORM is constructed based on five criteria.  A country is considered closed as long as one of the 
following criteria holds: (1) average tariff rates are higher than 40%, (2) nontariff barriers covered on 
average more than 40% of imports, (3) it has a socialist economic system, (4) it has a state monopoly of 
major exports, and (5) the black market premium exceeded 20%. Their presumption is that this variable is 
correlated with more general liberalizations. That is free trade policies are correlated with more widespread 
liberalizations within the economy. 
 
3 The variable for Economic Freedom is comprised of 10 components and is compiled by Heritage 
Foundation. Since two of our independent variables – corruption and government- are each included as one 
of the components of the Economic Freedom we exclude those two components from the Economic 
Freedom index.  
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results remain robust to their inclusion.  The bottom panel shows correlations.  We 
observe no strong association between democracy and growth or between corruption and 
growth. On the other hand, corruption and democracy are significantly correlated.  
However, these correlations do not necessarily imply causal links (or the lack thereof).  
The next two sections more deeply consider these potential links.  Finally, figure 1 shows 
how the cross-country averages of these variables have evolved over time.   
 
5. Methodology 
5.1 The Model 
We employ panel data techniques in order to capture the within country variation 
within the data. Consider the following empirical specification which we adapt from 
Ehrlich and Lui (1999), using many of their same control variables. The methodology we 
are using is also similar with the one Méon and Sekkat (2005) performed: 
 
Git     =  β0i   +   β1t   +  β2Xit  +  β 3 (DEM) it   +   β 4 (CO) it  + β5 (DEM*CO) it   +   εit   (1)   
 
where ti, denote country and time respectively.  GROWTH is the growth rate of real 
GDP per capita adjusted for PPP.  The intercepts β0i and β1t indicate country and year 
fixed effects in order to control for time invariant factors specific to a country as well as 
global shocks that influence all countries similarly.  Matrix X will initially be empty but 
will later contain control variables such as the lag of the natural log of GDP per capita 
(GDP) as well as the population growth rate (GPOP).  DEM is the Freedom House 
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democracy index, CO is the ICRG control of corruption index, and DE*CO is the 
interaction term between them.  Finally, ε denotes the error term where E ( ) = 0 for all 
i and t.  If β5 < 0, then an increase in the control of corruption raises growth more in 
authoritarian regimes. 
 
5.2 Potential endogeneity 
Potential endogeneity problems are present in the above empirical framework.  
Previous studies considered both corruption and democracy as endogenous variables.
1
  
Haque and Kneller (2005) find two-way causality between corruption and economic 
development due to the existence of threshold effects and multiple equilibria, explaining 
why the level of corruption varies across countries.  Blackburn, Bose and Haque (2002) 
also see development (i.e. growth) as affecting corruption. Using a theoretical model, 
they find that low development regimes are characterized with high incidents of 
corruption while high development regimes are characterized with low incidents of 
corruption.  Recent empirical studies have considered instruments to address these 
concerns, such as using ethnolinguistic fractionalization to instrument for corruption in a 
growth regression as did Mauro (1995).  However, Easterly and Levine (1997) posit that 
ethnic diversity has direct effects on growth, and so is perhaps not a suitable instrument 
for corruption.
2
  The use of fixed effects, though, in our model lessen endogeneity 
concerns because historical factors that influence growth, democracy, and corruption are 
                                                            
1See Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2007), Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Kauffman and 
Wei (2000) for examples where corruption is endogenous. 
2 Moreover, this instrument or others such as legal origin that have been used in the past are not useful for 
our purposes since they do not vary over time.   
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all implicitly captured by the fixed effects.  Of course, fixed effects do not resolve these 
issues and so we will also estimate (1) using difference-GMM estimation techniques.  
Nevertheless, in the remainder of this section we provide other evidence as to why 
democracy and corruption can be seen as exogenous in our specification.      
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008) [AJRY] argue that income does 
not lead to democratization.  We use a specification similar to theirs:     
            DEMit    =    β0 i +          β1t            +         β2DEM it-1  +     β 3 GDP it-1  + εit       (2) 
where ti, denote country and time respectively.  The dependent variable is the Freedom 
House political rights index, the same measure they consider.    
From column 1 of table 2, the coefficient estimate of β3 suggests that lagged 
income is insignificant.  This implies that income does not cause democratization once 
we control for time and fixed effects (AJRY, 2008).  Faster growing countries do not 
appear to be the ones becoming democratic.  We perform a similar specification but we 
replace DEM with the control of corruption (CO) in column 2.  Again, the results suggest 
that income does not cause corruption.  These results are not panaceas for alleviating 
endogneity concerns but they do provide some indication that increases in income are not 
driving democratization or the control of corruption.  
 Unfortunately, other endogeneity concerns also arise.  Several papers have 
considered how democracy affects corruption. Musila (2007) suggests that authoritarian 
countries are less prone to corruption than countries at intermediate levels of democracy, 
and, that beyond the threshold level of democracy, more democratic countries are less 
prone to corruption.  He also presents empirical results supporting this conjecture. Shen 
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and Williamson (2005) suggest that democracy has a positive effect on the perceived 
level of corruption control. Ali and Isse (2003) also present evidence that political 
freedom and transparency are positively correlated with corruption control.  Conversely, 
Ehrlich and Lui (1999) affirm that autocratic regimes could achieve growth rates equal to 
or higher than decentralized democracies because corruption is more constrained in the 
autocracies.
1
 Rivera-Batiz (2002), using a theoretical model, shows that stronger 
democratic institutions influence governance by constraining the actions of corrupt 
executives. 
In contrast, our work does not consider democracy as a causal factor of 
corruption.  To help show that democracy does not systematically cause corruption (or 
the lack thereof) we disaggregate countries into two groups, presented in Table 3.  The 
first group consists of countries that were always autocratic throughout our sample 
period. The second group consists of countries that were initially autocratic but 
experienced some form of democratization within our sample period.  We then take the 
average change in corruption for each group
2
. For the countries remaining autocratic, CO 
increased 1.18 on average.  For the second group (those becoming democratic), CO 
increased a nearly identical 1.28 points.  The countries that democratized during the 
sample period did not see a greatly different change in the level of corruption compared 
to those countries that remained autocratic.   
                                                            
1 See also Rock (2008) where he claims an inverted U relationship between the age of democracy and 
corruption. 
2 For each country we find the difference in corruption between the first year and the last year in our sample 
period. Then, we obtain the value of the total average change in corruption for each group. 
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We also list all the countries that democratized during our sample period in Table 
4.  For each country, we provide the average corruption score for the five years before 
and after democratization (or for fewer years for the countries where data is not 
available).  For some countries the corruption score went up, for others down, and for 
others it stayed the same.  Therefore, no clear pattern emerges between democratization 
and changes in corruption.  
Taking a step further we separate all the countries that democratized during our 
sample period into the five categories listed below: a) countries where the corruption 
index increased by more than one, b) countries where the corruption index increased but 
by less than one, c) countries where the corruption index decreased by more than one, d) 
countries where the corruption index decreased but by less than one and e) countries 
where the corruption index remained the same.  Panel B indicates that democratization 
does not appear to have a “common” effect on corruption across the sample. Ideally, we 
would hope to see that corruption does not change at all after democratization. However, 
we believe that the above frequency breakdown gives us to the next best outcome -- no 
clear relation between democratization and corruption -- which supports (to some extent) 
our view that democratization is generally not a causal factor of corruption.
1
  
An additional step towards addressing endogeneity is the use of dynamic GMM 
estimation techniques.  The specification becomes: 
                                                            
1 Treisman (2000) finds that corruption is lower in long-standing democracies but recent democracies are 
not associated with lower corruption. Presumably, our fixed effects model can capture historical conditions 
promoting persistent democracy and low corruption.  On the other hand, recent moves to democracy -- and 
so ones not captured by the fixed effects -- do not seem to lower corruption.  See also Billger and Goel 
(2009) where they explore the determinants of corruption using quantile regressions. They find that 
democracy lowers corruption but only in the most corrupt countries.  
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     GDPi,t  =   αi  +  βt  +  ζGDPi,t-1  +  θZi,t    +    εi,t                                                     (3)  
 
where Z denotes the possibly endogenous variables of DEM, CO, and their interaction.  
We then take the first difference of (3) to arrive at the growth rate.  Because of the 
potential endogeneity of DEM and CO, we first estimate (3) using the difference 
estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) using the second lag of the endogenous variables 
as instruments.  For these specifications, we use a Sargan test to examine whether these 
instruments are valid.  A key assumption is that ε is not serially correlated and so we also 
test the residual for first and second order serial correlation.  As shown below, neither the 
null hypothesis of valid instruments not the null hypothesis of no second order serial 
correlation is rejected.    
Additionally, we also estimate (3) using the system-GMM estimator from 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) which improves on the Arellano 
& Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator.  In the case of persistent explanatory 
variables (which is likely to be the case for our variables), Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 
(2001) suggest that the first-differenced GMM estimator can produce biased coefficients 
since the lagged levels of these variables serve as weak instruments. Alternatively, the 
Blundell & Bond (1998) system GMM estimates equation (3) in both first differences and 
levels which obtains more moment conditions thereby increasing efficiency.
1
  See 
                                                            
1A critical assumption, however, of system-GMM is that the fixed effects are not correlated with changes in 
the endogenous variables.     
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Blundell & Bond (1998), Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) and Roodman (2006) for further 
details.  
 
6. Econometric Results 
In table 5 we present the baseline results obtained from our fixed-effects model in 
(1).  In column 1, we estimate the first specification without including any explanatory 
variables but corruption, democracy and the interactive term.  We then add other control 
variables one at a time.  Column 3 shows results when adding GDP and GPOP as in 
Ehrlich and Lui (1999).  We find positive coefficients for corruption and democracy. The 
control of corruption and the level of democracy are positively associated with economic 
growth.  Columns 2 and 4 repeat these specifications but only for countries that were not 
always democratic during the sample period.    
These results are in line with empirical findings from previous studies. Firstly, 
more recent studies show that democracy enhances growth (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 
2008; Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005). Secondly, we provide evidence that corruption lowers 
economic growth (Mauro, 1995). However, the coefficient on the interactive term is 
negative. The association between corruption and economic growth is less positive in 
democracies, suggesting that the benefits upon growth of controlling corruption are 
actually greater in authoritarian regimes as we hypothesized.  The results are robust when 
we replace the Freedom House index with the DEM_PS indicator (Papaioannou & 
Siourounis, 2008). Column 1 of Table 6 presents these results when no other control 
variables are included in our specification. Column 2 presents the results after we control 
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for population growth and the level of initial income. In both cases the coefficient of the 
interactive term between corruption and DEM_PS remains statistically significant.   
To explore the economic magnitude suggested by these coefficient estimates, 
consider three hypothetical countries A, B, C, where the level of democracy is low 
(DEM=0), average (DEM=3) and high (DEM=6), respectively.  For country A and using 
the coefficient estimates from Table 5 – column 1, growth increases by 0.90 (=0.65 – 
0.14*1) percentage points when CO increases by one standard deviation, 1.39.  For 
country B, the control of corruption raises growth only by 0.31 percentage points.  For 
the fully democratic country C, the control of corruption lowers growth by 0.26 
percentage points. Certainly, the results indicate that the effects of corruption upon 
growth can vary greatly across countries with different political regimes. Most 
interestingly, the results reveal that the control of corruption might even lower growth in 
strong democracies.  Perhaps corruption in these strong democracies is more benign.  
Bribes could be used to “grease the wheel” in facilitating the commencement of 
productive activities and so limiting corruption would then lower growth.  This is not to 
say that corrupt activities always promote growth in democracies nor that these benign 
forms of corruption are absent in other countries, only that the proportions of these two 
types of corruption vary across countries.     
Table 7 considers additional control variables.  Column 1 presents the coefficient 
estimates when we control for economic freedom from the Heritage Foundation.  
Swaleheen and Stansel (2007) report that corruption lowers growth where economic 
freedom is high and lowers growth where economic freedom is low.  Since many 
democracies are considered economically free, perhaps our democracy variables are 
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proxies for economic freedom which is the real determinant of how corruption influences 
economic growth.  Using the same measure of economic freedom as do Swaleheen and 
Stansel (2007), the coefficient upon DEM and CO*DEM remains robust.   
Column 2 shows the parameter estimates when we add lagged government 
purchases (GOV) to the model.  Column 3 reports results with lagged investment (INV).  
Column 4 considers both.  In all three columns, the coefficients on CO, DEM, and 
DEM*CO remain robust.  Column 5 adds REFORM.  As before, corruption, democracy, 
and their interaction term remain statistically significant.
1
  
As an additional robustness check we performed dynamic GMM estimation as 
discussed above.  Table 8 presents these results for both difference-GMM and system-
GMM estimators. We run a specification with the only regressors being the lagged 
dependent variable, corruption, democracy and the interactive term between the two.  We 
consider all three variables endogenous and use their second lags (or second and third 
lags) as instruments.  The results of the GMM estimates are in agreement with the ones 
obtained from the fixed effects model. Both the coefficient estimates of control of 
corruption and democracy are significant and positive. In contrast, the interactive term 
between the two is negative and statistically significant.  In columns 2 and 4 of Table 8 
we replace the Democracy index with the one compiled by Papaioannou and Siourounis 
(2008) to obtain similar results with the previous measure of democracy.  Lastly, all six 
specifications in Table 8 pass the Sargan and the second order serial correlation tests.  
                                                            
1 We also considered life expectancy as an additional control variable although many observations are 
missing and so we do not report those results here.  Nevertheless, the coefficients on DEM, CO, and their 
interaction remained significant.   
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7. Conclusions  
Using a fixed-effects model and annual panel data from 1984 to 2007, we 
regressed economic growth on various controls and three additional variables: the inverse 
of the level of corruption, the degree of democracy, and an interaction between the two. 
We find that the control of corruption and the level of democracy are positively 
associated with economic growth. However, the coefficient on the interactive term is 
negative. The association between corruption and economic growth is less positive in 
democracies.   Several checks were performed to address endogneity concerns.  
We speculated that corruption and lobbying are two forms of rent seeking and that 
they are imperfect substitutes.  With greater opportunities for lobbying in democracies, 
lobbying provides for a better substitute with corruption than it does in nondemocracies.  
Therefore, controlling corruption in nondemocracies will have greater effects on growth.  
Our findings provide some evidence that these conjectures are correct.  However, the 
empirical work in this paper does not directly test these conjectures and so perhaps other 
possibilities can explain our findings.  Future work will more carefully examine the 
substitutability between these forms of rent seeking and how they could vary across 
political regimes.   
In addition, we also found that controlling corruption could even lower growth in 
strong democracies and speculated that the nature of corruption could also differ across 
countries.  Perhaps corrupt activities are more productive in one set of countries, such as 
strong democracies, where bribes could more likely be used as “speed money” to help 
launch productive projects.  Controlling corruption in these countries might then lower 
growth.  Further examining this possibility is also left for future work. 
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Appendix  
Variable Definitions and Sources 
GROWTH: Annual growth rate of GDP per capita adjusted for PPP. Source: Penn 
World Tables, version 6.3 (Constant Prices: Chain Series). 
GDP:  Natural log of GDP per capita adjusted for PPP.  Source:  Penn World Tables, 
version 6.3 (Constant prices:  Chain Series). 
GOV:  Annual Government Share of Real GDP per capita. Source: Penn World Tables, 
version 6.3 (Constant $). 
INV: Annual Investment Share of Real GDP per capita. Source: Penn World Tables, 
version 6.3 (Constant $). 
REFORM: Dummy variable that indicates whether a country is open to trade.  Source: 
Sachs and Warner (1995) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003).  
ECON_FREE: Index of Economic Freedom from Heritage Foundation.  
GPOP: Annual Population Growth. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 
CD-ROM (2009 Edition). 
CO: International Country Risk Guide indicator of corruption from Political Risk 
Services, Inc. 
DEM: Freedom House (Gastil) Index.  
DEM_PS: Dummy variable for democratization events; 0 before; 1 after and can be used 
as a proxy for democracy. Papaioannou & Siourounis (2008). 
The classification of countries in Table 9 between democratic and authoritarian regimes 
is taken from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008).  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Correlation, Covariance Matrices 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
     
Variable Observations  Mean Maximum Minimum 
 Std. 
Dev. 
Growth Rate of Real GDP per capita 2823 1.66 88.74 -64.36 6.61 
CO 2823 3.09 6 0 1.39 
DEM 2823 3.38 6 0 1.99 
DEM_PS 2823 0.55 1 0 0.49 
GDP 2823 8.71 11.38 5.03 1.21 
GOV 2823 16.83 62.44 3.05 7.93 
 
Panel B: Correlation and Covariance Matrices 
                           
                           Covariance                          
Correlation                          
Observations Growth CO DEM DEM_PS GDP GOV                     
Growth 43.73                          
 1.00                          
 2823                          
                           
CO 0.47 1.93                         
 0.05 1.00                         
 2823 2823                         
                           
DEM 1.42 1.43 3.99                        
 0.10 0.51 1.00                        
 2823 2823 2823                        
                           
PS_DEM 0.36 0.25 0.82 0.24                       
 0.11 0.37 0.83 1.00                       
 2823 2823 2823 2823                       
                           
GDP 0.86 0.88 1.19 0.20 1.48                      
 0.10 0.52 0.49 0.33 1.00                      
 2823 2823 2823 2823 2823                      
                           
GOV -1.80 -0.25 -1.66 -0.26 -2.10 62.90                     
 -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.13 1.00                     
 2823 2823 2823 2823 2823 2823                     
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Table 2: Total Average Change in Corruption for the period 1984-2007   
  GROUP A Change in Corruption GROUP B Change in Corruption 
 
Albania 3 Algeria 1.5 
 
Bangladesh 2.041667 Angola 1 
 
Brazil 1.416 Bahrain 1 
 
Bulgaria 2 Brunei 2.5 
 
Chile 1.16 Burkina Faso 2 
 
El Salvador 0.5 Cameroon 2.25 
 
Ethiopia 1 China  1.875 
 
Ghana 0.083 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 
 
Guatemala 0.5 Congo, Republic of 2 
 
Guyana 1 Cote d`Ivoire 0.7 
 
Hungary 1 Cuba 0.5 
 
Indonesia 2.04 Egypt 0.33 
 
Iran 1 Gabon 1 
 
Korea, Republic of 0.33 Guinea 1 
 
Madagascar 4 Guinea-Bissau 0 
 
Malawi 2.125 Haiti 1 
 
Mali 1 Iraq 1.66 
 
Mexico 1 Jordan 0 
 
Mongolia 2 Kenya 1.5 
 
Mozambique 2.33 Kuwait 0 
 
Nicaragua 0.5 Liberia 1.5 
 
Niger 2.7 Malaysia 2.16 
 
Nigeria 0.16 Libya 1.5 
 
Panama 0 Morocco 1 
 
Paraguay 0.75 Oman 0.5 
 
Philippines 2 Qatar 0.5 
 
Poland 0.5 Saudi Arabia 1.33 
 
Romania 0.5 Sierra Leone 0.5 
 
Senegal 0.5 Singapore 1.5 
 
South Africa 3.5 Somalia 3 
 
Suriname 0 Sudan 0.41 
 
Tanzania 0.74 Syria 0.58 
 
Thailand 1.5 Togo 0.5 
 
Uruguay 0 Tunisia 1 
 
Zambia 1.91 Uganda 1 
   
United Arab Emirates 1 
   
Vietnam 0.95 
 
    Zimbabwe 3.33 
  Total Avg. Change in Corruption 1.28   1.18 
Group A: Countries that experienced some form of democratization between 1984 -2007. 
Group B: Countries that were always autocratic in the period 1984-2007.  
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Table 3: Average Corruption Score – Democratized Countries between 1984 -2007   
PANEL A: 
       
   Country 
5 years before 
Democratization 
5 years after 
democratization     Country 
5 years before 
Democratization 
5 years after 
democratization 
 
Albania 4.00 3.57 19 Mongolia 4.00 4.00 
 
Bangladesh 0.02 1.67 20 Mozambique 4.00 4.00 
 
Brazil 3.41 4.00 21 Nicaragua 4.88 5.00 
 
Bulgaria 3.58 4.20 22 Niger 1.72 0.80 
 
Chile 3.00 3.00 23 Nigeria 1.90 1.00 
 
El Salvador 2.23 3.33 24 Panama 2.00 2.00 
 
Ethiopia 2.32 2.00 25 Paraguay 0.80 2.03 
 
Ghana 3.10 2.42 26 Philippines 0.56 2.00 
 
Guatemala 2.00 3.80 27 Poland 4.00 4.98 
 
Guyana 1.00 2.15 28 Romania 2.00 3.90 
 
Hungary 4.00 4.95 29 Senegal 3.00 3.00 
 
Indonesia 0.27 2.20 30 South Africa 5.00 4.73 
 
Iran 3.63 3.79 31 Suriname 2.28 3.00 
 
Korea, Republic of 2.21 2.75 32 Tanzania 4.00 2.78 
 
Madagascar 4.00 4.00 33 Thailand 3.00 3.00 
 
Malawi 3.50 3.00 34 Uruguay 3.00 3.00 
 
Mali 1.45 2.60 35 Zambia 2.00 3.33 
 
Mexico 2.90 2.73         
PANEL B: Corruption Index - Frequency Breakdown 
  
  Increased by <1 Increased by >1 Remained the same Decreased by <1 Decreased by >1 
 
Brazil  Bangladesh Chile Albania Tanzania 
 
Bulgaria El Salvador Madagascar Ethiopia 
 
 
Hungary Guatemala Mongolia Ghana 
 
 
Iran Guyana Mozambique Malawi 
 
 
Korea,  Republic of Indonesia Panama Mexico 
 
 
Nicaraguw Mali Senegal Niger 
 
 
Poland Paraguay Thailand Nigeria 
 
 
Suriname Philippines Uruguay South Africa 
 
  
Romania 
   
 
  Zambia       
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Table 4:  PANEL DATA REGRESSIONS: Fixed Effects Models                   
                          Dependent variable 
       Democracy                          Corruption  
  1 2 
  1984-2007 
   
Constant  1.31*** 0.57 
(0.44) (0.57) 
DEM (-1)  0.82***  
(0.01)  
GDP (-1) -0.07 -0.01 
(0.04) (0.06) 
CO (-1)    0.84*** 
   (0.01) 
 
R
2
 0.96 0.93 
# of Countries 119 119 
# of observations 2732 2705 
 
(i) Standard errors in parentheses 
(ii) *** and **denote significance at the 1% and 5%  levels, respectively 
(iii) Regressions performed utilized White heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrices 
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Table 5:  PANEL DATA REGRESSIONS: Fixed Effects Models                   
 Dependent variable:  annual per capita GDP growth (1984 – 2007) 
       1             2            3     4  
     
Constant          -1.56 -1.73** 73.40**   33.96***  
(1.117) (1.49) (14.96)   (10.45)  
CO 0.659** 0.94***  0.85**   1.02*  
(0.332) (0.48)  (0.42)   (0.59)  
DEM  0.878*** 1.40*** 1.01***      1.24**  
(0.296) (0.47) (0.35) (0.54)  
CO*DEM  -0.149** -0.41***  -0.24*** -0.38**  
(0.074) (0.13) (0.09) (0.16)  
GDP(-1)   -8.60***  -4.65***  
  (1.75) (1.19)  
GPOP   -0.03**       0.80*  
  (0.50)   (0.591)  
     
      
R
2
 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.29  
# of Countries 119 76 119 76  
# of observations 2823 1803  2713 1641  
(i) Standard errors in parentheses 
(ii) *** and **denote significance at the 1% and 5%  levels, respectively 
(iii) Regressions performed utilized White heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrices 
Columns 2 and 4 remove countries that were always democratic during the sample period. 
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Table 6:  PANEL DATA REGRESSIONS: Fixed Effects Models                  
Robustness Checks using alternative measure for Democracy 
  Dependent variable:  per capita GDP growth   
  1 2 
  1984-2007 
   
Constant -0.10  35.65
***
 
(0.79) (10.07) 
CO 0.38 0.37 
(0.30) (0.26) 
DEM_PS  2.03
**
  2.24
**
 
(0.93) (0.87) 
CO*DEM_PS  -0.73
***
 -0.67
**
 
(0.30) (0.30) 
GDP(-1)   -4.63
***
 
 (1.24) 
GPOP    0.88
***
 
 (0.30) 
   
R
2
 0.18 0.28 
# of Countries 76 76 
# of observations 1780 1641 
(i) Standard errors in parentheses 
(ii) *** and **denote significance at the 1% and 5%  levels, respectively 
(iii) Regressions performed utilized White heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrices 
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Table 7:  PANEL DATA REGRESSIONS: Fixed Effects Models with additional control 
variables 
Dependent variable:  per capita GDP growth (1984-2007) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
    
Constant     -3.62   34.57
***
   32.64
***
  36.54
***
  20.13
***
 
      (3.87) (8.72) (9.97) (9.29) (7.59) 
CO 1.36
**
 1.10
**
 1.03
*
 1.00
*
        0.91
*
 
      (0.67) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.55) 
DEM    1.48 
***
  1.23
***
  1.26
**
 1.20
**
 1.05
**
 
      (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.53) (0.45) 
CO*DEM -.30
**
   -0.35
***
 -0.37
**
 -0.34
**
 -0.29
**
 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) 
GDP(-1) 
 
 -4.46
***
  -4.65
***
 -4.73
***
  2.82
***
 
 
 
(0.95) (1.13) (0.98) (0.83) 
GPOP 
 
0.80
**
 0.76
*
 0.76
*
 0.4 
 
 
(0.41) (0.42) (0.43) (0.33) 
GOV(-1) 
 
 -0.15
**
  -0.14
*
 -0.11
*
 
 
 
(0.07)  (0.08) (0.06) 
INV(-1) 
 
  0.06
**
 0.03 0.03 
 
 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
REFORM 
 
    1.44
**
 
 
 
   (0.66) 
ECON_FREE 0.001     
 (0.98)     
 
 
    
 
 
    
R
2
 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.29 
# of Countries 71 76 76 76 76 
# of obs.  838 1611 1611  1641 1365 
(i) Standard errors in parentheses 
(ii) *** and **denote significance at the 1% and 5%  levels, respectively 
(iv) Regressions performed utilized White heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrices 
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TABLE 8: Dynamic GMM regressions 1984-2007  
Dependent Variable - Real GDP per capita  (GDP) 
  diff-GMM diff-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
        
GDP  (-1)   1.04
*** 
 1.04
***
 1.07
***
 1.00 
***
    1.00
***
  1.00
***
 
   (0.003)  (0.001)   (0.009)   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) 
CO   0.013
*** 
 0.010
***
  0.018
***
  0.003
***
  0.003
***
  0.019
***
 
   (0.001)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)   (0.001)  (0.001) 
DEM   0.027
*** 
 0.023
***
   0.018
***
  0.010
***
  
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000)  
DEM_PS   0.11
***
     0.15
***
 
   (0.022)    (0.132) 
CO*DEM -0.002
*** 
-0.001
***
  -0.001
***
  -0.001
***
  
 
   (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
CO*DEM_PS    -0.025
***
     -0.041
***
 
 
  (0.005)     (0.003) 
       
       
Lags of Instruments 
Included 
2 2,3 2 2 2,3 2 
# of Countries 119 119 119 119 119 119 
# of Observations 2607 2607 2607 2726 2726 2726 
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.23 0.95 0.53 0.71 0.98 0.11 
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.46 0.46 0.11 0.43 0.43 0.57 
(i) Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
(ii) *** and **denote significance at the 1% and 5%  levels, respectively 
DEM, DEM_PS, and CO are all assumed to be endogenous.     
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Table 9: Political Regimes (119 cross-sections) 
 Political Regime Classification 1984 -2007 
No. Country Classification 
1 Albania Democratization: 1992 
2 Algeria Always Autocracy 
3 Angola Always Autocracy 
4 Argentina Always Democracy 
5 Australia Always Democracy 
6 Austria Always Democracy 
7 Bahamas Always Democracy 
8 Bahrain Always Autocracy 
9 Bangladesh Democratization:1991 
10 Belgium Always Democracy 
11 Bolivia Always Democracy 
12 Botswana Always Democracy 
13 Brazil Democratization:1985 
14 Brunei Always Autocracy 
15 Bulgaria Democratization:1991 
16 Burkina Faso Always Autocracy 
17 Cameroon Always Autocracy 
18 Canada Always Democracy 
19 Chile Democratization:1990 
20 China Always Autocracy 
21 Colombia Always Democracy 
22 Congo, Dem. Rep. Always Autocracy 
23 Congo, Republic of Always Autocracy 
24 Costa Rica Always Democracy 
25 Cote d`Ivoire Always Autocracy 
26 Cuba Always Autocracy 
27 Cyprus Always Democracy 
28 Denmark Always Democracy 
29 Dominican Republic Always Democracy 
30 Ecuador Always Democracy 
31 Egypt Always Autocracy 
32 El Salvador Democratization:1994 
33 Ethiopia Democratization:1995 
34 Finland Always Democracy 
35 France Always Democracy 
36 Gabon Always Autocracy 
37 Gambia, The Reverse Transition:1994 
38 Ghana Democratization:1996 
39 Greece Always Democracy 
40 Guatemala Democratization:1996 
41 Guinea Always Autocracy 
42 Guinea-Bissau Always Autocracy 
43 Guyana Democratization:1992 
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44 Haiti Always Autocracy 
45 Honduras Always Democracy 
46 Hungary Democratization:1990 
47 Iceland Always Democracy 
48 India Always Democracy 
49 Indonesia Democratization:1999 
50 Iran Democratization:1997 
51 Iraq Always Autocracy 
52 Ireland Always Democracy 
53 Israel Always Democracy 
54 Italy Always Democracy 
55 Jamaica Always Democracy 
56 Japan Always Democracy 
57 Jordan Always Autocracy 
58 Kenya Always Autocracy 
59 Korea, Republic of Democratization:1988 
60 Kuwait Always Autocracy 
61 Lebanon Reverse Transition:1975 
62 Liberia Always Autocracy 
63 Libya Always Autocracy 
64 Luxembourg Always Democracy 
65 Madagascar Democratization:1993 
66 Malawi Democratization:1994 
67 Malaysia Always Intermediate 
68 Mali Democratization:1992 
69 Malta Always Democracy 
70 Mexico Democratization:1997 
71 Mongolia Democratization:1993 
72 Morocco Always Autocracy 
73 Mozambique Democratization:1994 
74 Namibia Always Democracy 
75 Netherlands Always Democracy 
76 New Zealand Always Democracy 
77 Nicaragua Democratization:1990 
78 Niger Democratization:1999 
79 Nigeria Democratization:1999 
80 Norway Always Democracy 
81 Oman Always Autocracy 
82 Pakistan Volatile 
83 Panama Democratization:1994 
84 Papua New Guinea Always Democracy 
85 Paraguay Democratization:1993 
86 Peru Always Democracy 
87 Philippines Democratization:1987 
88 Poland Democratization:1990 
89 Portugal Always Democracy 
90 Qatar Always Autocracy 
91 Romania Democratization:1990 
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92 Saudi Arabia Always Autocracy 
93 Senegal Democratization:2000 
94 Sierra Leone Always Autocracy 
95 Singapore Always Autocracy 
96 Somalia Always Autocracy 
97 South Africa Democratization:1994 
98 Spain Always Democracy 
99 Sri Lanka Always Democracy 
100 Sudan Always Autocracy 
101 Suriname Democratization:1991 
102 Sweden Always Democracy 
103 Switzerland Always Democracy 
104 Syria Always Autocracy 
105 Tanzania Democratization:1995 
106 Thailand Democratization:1992 
107 Togo Always Autocracy 
108 Trinidad &Tobago Always Democracy 
109 Tunisia Always Autocracy 
110 Turkey Always Democracy 
111 Uganda Always Autocracy 
112 United Arab Emirates Always Autocracy 
113 United Kingdom Always Democracy 
114 United States Always Democracy 
115 Uruguay Democratization:1985 
116 Venezuela Always Democracy 
117 Vietnam Always Autocracy 
118 Zambia Democratization:1991 
119 Zimbabwe Always Autocracy 
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Figure 1. Mean Democracy, Corruption, Growth (1984-2007) 
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